Questions raised by scientists about the relationship between chronic diseases and environmental exposures have formed the basis for numerous lawsuits seeking to obtain compensation for diseases claimed to be caused by those exposures. Scientists, as a result, are sought by the legal system to provide expert testimony on these topics. This article attempts to describe for scientists the legal system into which they are being asked to enter, to review the various ways in which courts have responded to the uncertainties in this area, and to suggest some cautions to scientists about their role in this system.
INTRODUCTION S SOCIETY BECOMES MORE TECHNOLOGICALLY COMPLEX, it becomes increasingly difficult to allocate fairly the
A health costs of that complexity. The allocation must be based on social principles as well as on scientific evidence. In recent years, we have improved our knowledge of possible relationships between our technology and such diseases as cancer. With this information, however, have come increasing claims that the disease was preventable, that it would not have happened but for the technology.
Science has raised these questions, but it is the legal system that is asked to resolve the claims. It, in turn, asks for answers science unfortunately does not yet have. Can a particular chemical cause human cancer? Does it always do so? If an individual is exposed to two chemicals that may cause cancer, which one caused the cancer? If he was exposed at different times in his life, which one caused it? Would he have gotten the cancer even in the absence of the exposure? The scientist is asked to participate in cases involving these claims because he or she has an expertise that the law believes will help resolve the questions. The scientist generally is hesitant to join this partnership. Initially, the legal system seems welcoming. It appears to use the same language and to respect the valuable assistance that the scientist provides. Difficulties begin when the scientist realizes that lawyers do not really speak the same language, although they use the same words, and when it becomes clear that the questions being asked may not lend themselves to scientific solutions. Words like "cause," "proof," "evidence" do not mean the same thing to scientists and to lawyers.
This article is an effort to present a view of the legal system to toxicologists and to point out some difficulties that are created when these two very different cultures interact.
There are many areas where law and toxicology come together. This article concentrates, however, on the issue of product liability, that is, the problem of deciding whether a manufacturer should be held responsible for a chronic disease that develops in an individual who has had some contact with its product. The question asked the scientist is whether the product "caused' the disease.
THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDER TORT LAW
Tort law allocates the cost of injuries. It is, of course, not the only way to allocate such costs. Health insurance and workers' compensation insurance serve similarends. The tort system also attempts to deter behavior that might result in harm by allocating the cost of harm to the party responsible for it. In this way, theoretically, individuals will be motivated to adjust their behavior to avoid causing harm.
Tort law developed as a response to injuries caused by negligent acts, for example, the runaway horse, the broken step, the skidding car. The underlying social principle is that when individuals are injured by the negligent conduct of another, the negligent party should bear the cost of that injury. If a car moving at 60 miles per hour in a snowstorm hits another vehicle, the driver of the first car would be liable for the injury if a jury determined that he had not acted as a "reasonably prudent man" would have acted under the circumstances. The payment is meant to compensate the injured party and to deter the defendant and others from similar conduct in the future.
The decision to accomplish the goals of compensation and deterrence in a single system works fairly well when a responsible individual can be identified. It does not work at all, however, for individuals whose injuries cannot be attributed to an identifiable fault. This system, for example, provides no compensation for an individual disabled by a stroke, whereas it will compensate a similarly disabled individual whose condition came about because a truck (owned by a well-insured company) ran a red light."' The allocation of responsibility for injuries is a social judgment. If a man, for example, is injured by one of two hunters, both negligently firing in his direction at the same time, the law will hold both hunters responsible unless one can demonstrate that it was the other who caused the injury.'" Our notions of social responsibility, however, would dictate that the same result would probably not be obtained in a paternity case where there is an equal chance that one of two men could have been the father of a child.
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
Product liability law evolved from the law of negligence and has been modified by more recent social judgments. Our legislatures and courts, for example, have determined that the manufacturer of a product will be liable for injuries caused by the product even in the absence of negligence.
Liability for an injury caused by a product is found in three situations. The first is where there has been a "manufacturing defect," such as when a foreign object finds its way into a package of food. There may have been no individual negligence, and the safeguards used by the company may have been unimpeachable. These facts, however, would not relieve the company of liability. The second is a "design defect," where a product causes an injury as a result of a faulty design (for example, a gas tank that explodes in a crash). To establish that the design was defective, the plaintiff must show that a safer alternative was available. There is no requirement of actual negligence in the design process. The manufacturer is expected to find the best possible design, The third situation is a "failure to warn." Here, the product contains a danger of which the manufacturer has been aware, such as a side effect of a drug, but has not provided a reasonable warning.
This system is based, in part, on negligence concepts but is principally premised on the social judgment that the costs of injury are best borne by the manufacturer, who can distribute the cost through insurance and price increases.
Product liability law sometimes deviates quite far from traditional negligence concepts. In New Jersey, which probably represents one end of this spectrum, asbestos manufacturers contended that because there was no scientific knowledge before the 1960s that low-level exposure was a health hazard, they had no obligation to warn workers exposed to low levels of asbestos. The court rejected this defen~e.'~'
The court ruled that the relevant question was simply whether the product, without a warning, was unreasonably dangerous, not whether the manufacturer knew that such a warning was necessary. The court held for the plaintiff, not because the manufacturer failed to act properly but because the manufacturer had a greater ability to pay the cost of the risk through insurance. The court reasoned that it would create an incentive for manufacturers to invest more in research about health effects if they could not rely on what science happened to know. In a later case, the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to extend this rule to a pharmaceutical case, and so it appears that Beshdd3' may apply only to asbestos cases.(4)
CHRONIC DISEASE LITIGATION
Another modification of the traditional negligence principles was made for claims of injury to female children of women who took diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy to prevent miscarriage. The plaintiffs generally were unable to prove which brand of DES had been used by their mothers. The Supreme Court of California extended the analysis in the bird shot case (2) and held that each defendant would be held liable in proportion to its market share of the product unless it could prove that its product could not have been used by the plaintiffs. '5' New York has extended this to apply market share liability even to manufacturers whose product could not have been the one used, so long as they were selling the drug at the time.'6'
CAUSATION OF INJURY
Although the requirement that there must have been "negligence" has been relaxed, the plaintiff must still establish that the product was the cause of the injury.
As Aristotle reminded us, there are many "causes" of an event. What, for example, causes a light bulb to bum out? A physicist might look to changes in the molecular structure of the filament, an engineer to the decline in its tensile strength, and the lawyer might look to the person who last turned the switch. All are correct. They each look at the question for different purposes."'
The lawyer's approach to causation is based on an effort to find a socially appropriate allocation of responsibility.
His is not a function of identifying influences towards harm which may be found in pathology. Instead, his is a function of identifying influences towards legal responsibility for harm which may lie in the habits and behaviors of the surrounding society in which man and his pathological risks are cast. He must find the door most deserving of the cost of harm, be it the victim's or at other's; and to do that he need not search among the microbes.'"
The lawyer seeks the "cause" of an injury in order to identify the socially "responsible" party. Causation is proven when the plaintiff has demonstrated "but-for'' causation.
The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event, if the event would not have occurred without it.'9' "But-for'' causation is termed "causation-in-fact.''
The law recognizes that there can be many "but-for'' causes of a particular result. If the result was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's action, the action will be considered to be a "proximate cause." The conclusion that "for want of a horseshoe the kingdom was lost" is a statement of causation-in-fact. The lawyer must still ask whether the blacksmith who improperly shoed the horse should be held responsible for the loss of the kingdom. This asks whether the negligent shoeing was a "proximate cause."
The classic case of proximate causation is Palsgraft v The Long IslandRailroad Company, 1928."') In Palsgraf, a man carrying a package had jumped aboard a moving train. He appeared to be unsteady, and two station attendants pushed him to try to steady him. During this, the package he was carrying fell. The package contained fireworks, which exploded. Mrs. Palsgraft who was standing on the platform was injured by a platform scale that became dislodged by the explosion. The Court of Appeals found that the railroad was not responsible for her injury because it could not reasonably have foreseen that such an injury could result from negligently pushing a passenger. The action of the guards was not a "proximate cause" of the injury.
When the injury is a chronic disease, causation-in-fact is difficult to establish. Other than a signature disease that is uniquely associated with a particular exposure, chronic diseases, such as cancer and cardiovascular disease, are generally regarded as multifactorial. Although public health officials present statistical associations as if they were causal relationships, scientists recognize that associations do not prove causation generally and certainly cannot do so in an individual case.
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR PROOF OF CAUSATION
Whether or not science can clearly identify the cause of, for example, a specific cancer, the law must nonetheless make decisions. To not decide is to decide one way. If an individual is claiming damages for disease causation, to not decide the case is to decide against the plaintiff.
DAVIDSON
Courts have, for example, often been willing to accept the opinions of clinicians even without controlled experimental support for their conclusions. This may have something to do with the reliance placed on physicians to answer "What's wrong with me?" and "Why am I sick?" Plaintiffs have been awarded damages in cases alleging "trauma cancer," although scientists doubt whether cancers actually are caused by traumas.
In one case, a woman bruised her breast while getting on a bus. Five months later, a metastatic cancer was discovered at the site of the injury. Her physician testified that the cancer was caused by the injury."') In another case, a physician testified that a cancer discovered 3 months after an injury to a woman's breast was caused by the injury."*'
The opinion of a physician can be considered by the jury if he can state to a "reasonable degree of medical certainty" that the disease was caused by the injury. The words sometimes take on a magical quality. In one case, a physician testified that a hernia was caused by an accident. He could not say that it was a "reasonable medical certainty" but only that it was a "90% chance." The court ruled that his testimony did not meet the standard for an expert opinion and could not, therefore, support a causal relationship. On retrial, the physician testified that a 90% chance was a "reasonable degree of medical certainty." That testimony was s~fficient."~)
More recently, a jury awarded damages based on a claim that pulmonary fibrosis was caused by dermal exposure to paraq~at."~' The plaintiff's treating physician based his conclusion on the clinical history and on his awareness of three other cases in which workers who had pulmonary fibrosis had also been exposed to paraquat. Experts testified that the available epidemiologic and toxicologic evidence did not support the conclusion that dermal exposure to paraquat was a cause of pulmonary fibrosis.
In sustaining the jury verdict, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia described it as a "classic battle of the experts, a battle in which the jury must decide the winner.""4. p. L535) The Court explained that the verdict would be sustained despite the lack of a clear scientific answer.
A cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that, in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the basic methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is sound, such asuse of tissue samples, standard tests, and patient examination, product liability law does not preclude recovery until a "statistically significant" number of people have been injured or until science has had the time and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory studies of the chemical. In a courtroom, the testfor allowing a plaintif to recover in a tort suit of this type is not scientific certuinty but legal suficiency; if reasonable jurors could conclude from the expert testimony that paraquat more likely than not caused Ferebee's injury, the fact that anotherjury might reach the opposite conclusion or that science would require more evidence before conclusively considering the causation question resolved is irrelevant. That Ferebee's case may have been the first of its exact type, or that his doctors may have been the first alert enough to recognize such a case, does not mean that the testimony of those doctors, who are concedingly well qualified in their fields, should not have been admitted.(I4. PP. 1535-1536) [emphasis added] Some courts, however, will not simply leave the decision to the jury but will themselves scrutinize expert testimony and reject testimony that lacks reliability. A court granted summary judgment in a case alleging that dermatologic and central nervous problems were caused by exposure to a herbicid-Tordon 1OK. The court ruled that the clinician's testimony offered by the plaintiff was not based on the type of considerations generally accepted in the field and was, therefore, inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 703.(15' Rule 703 is becoming an increasingly important tool for federal judges who wish to exercise some control over the "battle of the experts." The rule states as follows:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.(l6'
In the Tordon 10K case, the expert testified that he had been unaware that the plaintiff had a family history of hypertension, discounted that the plaintiff did not react to a small administered dose of Tordon IOK, and discounted CHRONIC DISEASE LITIGATION the presence of high levels of Dieldrin in the plaintiff's blood tests. He relied primarily on animal experiments that reported tumor production with one of the chemical constituents of Tordon 10K.
The court rejected the testimony, concluding that if an expert opinion is fundamentally unsupported then it offers no expert assistance to the jury. Without more than credentials and the subjective opinion an expert's testimony that "it is so" is not admissible. (I5, p. 
424)
Where the scientific evidence is inconclusive, as is often true, some courts have adopted the Ferebee approach that "legal sufficiency" does not require "scientific certainty."
In a case alleging that birth defects were caused by the use of a spermicide, an appellate court upheld a verdict despite the fact that the District Court "found the studies to be inconclusive on the ultimate issue of whether the product caused Kitty Wells' birth defects."("'
The judge at the trial level rendered a verdict for the plaintiff on the claim that the infant's several birth defects had been caused by her mother's use of a spermicide. The epidemiologic evidence regarding this spermicide had been reviewed by an FDA panel, which concluded that the "preponderance of available evidence indicates no association.""*'
A New York Times editorial characterized the case as one where "the Federal judiciary has placed itself opposite the best judgment of the scientific community" and quoted the New England Journal of Medicine to the effect that The Wells v. Ortho decisions are of great concern to the medical community because they indicate that the courts will not be bound by reasonable standards of proof."')
The judge based his opinion on an evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. He chose to believe the pharmacologist who testified for the plaintiff rather than the epidemiologist who testified for the defense.
An illuminating footnote to this case is provided by a series of letters published in the Journal ofrhe American Medical Association from the authors of an epidemiologic study that reported an association between the spermicide and birth defects. One of the authors concluded, after reanalyzing the data, that their conclusion had been inaccurate because there had been a significant misclassification of the exposed population. Three of the authors noted that they had included caveats in the article cautioning against causal interpretations. Another of the authors wrote that the "article should never have been published." His hindsight analysis bears repeating.
In our present litigious environment, the reservations and qualifications written into a published report are often ignored, and the article is used as "proof'of a causal relationship. It would have been much more appropriate for our findings to have gone through the more traditional process of being discussed among colleagues at scientific meetings. In this process, the issues we raised and others would have been discussed among investigators. This withering process could have altered the way the manuscript was written or might have delayed its submission until more information was a~ailable."~'
In cases involving Bendectin, an antinausea drug used during pregnancy, courts have reached diametrically opposite conclusions about whether the drug is capable of causing birth defects. In most cases, the verdicts have been for the defendants. The company has nonetheless ceased manufacturing the drug and has settled with a plaintiff group for $120 million.
In one case, a judge set aside a $1.6 million jury verdict on the grounds that "no reasonable jury could find on the basis thereof that this infant plaintiff's birth defects were more likely than not to have been caused by her intrauterine exposure to Bendectin."'zo'
The judge based his conclusion on epidemiologic evidence that did not show any association. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, noting that the toxicologic evidence was insufficient to support the experts' conclusions that there was a causal relationship with birth defects.'2''
In another case, based on almost identical evidence, a jury verdict for the plaintiff also was reversed by the trial judge. The appeals court, however, reinstated the verdict on the Ferebee grounds that this was a "battle of the experts" and that the judge should not second guess the jury.'**)
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The defense in both cases relied on the testimony of epidemiologists that there was no association between Bendectin and birth defects. The plaintiff's main witness was Dr. Alan K. Done, a pediatrician and toxicologic consultant.
Dr. Done relied on the following toxicologic data: The judge in Richardson concluded Though Dr. Done might disagree, there is a universally held scientific consensus that Bendectin has not been shown to be a teratogen, and the issue being a scientific one, reasonable jurors could not reject that consensus without indulging in precisely the same speculation and conjecture which the multiple investigations undertook, but failed, to confirm. That Dr. Done remains an unbeliever and was willing to testify to his disbelief "with reasonable medical certainty" does not mandate that this case be left as the jury decided it.'20'
A component of
A different approach was taken by Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation. He made use of Rule 703 to preclude evidence before the case was heard by the jury. Judge Weinstein had approved a $180 million settlement on behalf of veterans claiming to have suffered illnesses from exposure to dioxin in Vietnam despite his conclusion that the available epidemiologic data would not have supported the claims. Judge Weinstein described the difference between the proof required for regulation and that required for compensation.
the distinction between avoidance of risk through regulation and compensation for injuries after the fact is a fundamental one. In the former, regulation may lead to control of a toxic substance even though the probability of harm to any individual is small and the studies necessary to assess the risk are incomplete, society as a whole is willing to pay the price as a matter of policy. In the latter, a far higher probability (greater than 50%) is required since the law believes it unfair to require an individual to pay for another's tragedy unless it is shown that it is more likely than not that he caused it. '23) Some plaintiffs had decided to "opt out" of the class. Their cases were dismissed by Judge Weinstein on the grounds that the causation evidence was inadmissible under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. After reviewing the proposed testimony of the plaintiff's expert, Judge Weinstein concluded All the diseases in the cases he relies upon are found in the general population of those who were never exposed to Agent Orange. There is no showing that the incidence of the diseases relied upon are greater in the Agent Orange exposed population than in the population generally."3'
He also commented on the toxicological data.
The animal studies are not helpful in the instant case because they involve different biological species. They are of so little probative force and are so potentially misleading as to be inadmissible. See Fed. Rules of Evidence 401-403. They cannot be an acceptable predicate for an opinion under Rule703.'23. P- 1241) The technique used by Judge Weinstein was also applied in a case where injuries were alleged to have been caused to neighborhood residents by exposure to PCBs from a railroad yard.'*" The defendants submitted an affidavit signed by a group of medical doctors and scientists who concluded that there was no support for the claim that PCB exposure was a cause of the various diseases at issue. The trial judge ruled that toxicologic evidence alone could not establish that the diseases were caused by the exposure and would, therefore, be inadmissible CHRONIC DISEASE LITIGATION under Rule 703 because it was "not of a type reasonably relied upon" to form opinions about disease causation in humans.
The court found that the defense experts
Unequivocally contradict the proposition that the results of animal studies can ever be the basis of a finding that a disease of a particular human being is more likely than not caused by a particular chemical. The defendants argue that animal studies are an appropriate method for regulatory agencies to determine whether or not there is any risk that a particular chemical might be a threat to public health but they are totally irrelevant in a tort case where the question is whether it is more likely than not that defendant caused plaintiff's i n j~r y . "~)
The judge further concluded that the statements of the plaintiffs' witnesses were also precluded by Rule 403, which states
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.""
The judge characterized the toxicologic testimony as follows:
She finds PCBs caused hypertension and asthma even in people who have family histories of hypertension and asthma. She finds that PCBs caused plaintiff's emotional distress, despite the fact that her area of expertise has nothing to do with emotional diseases and she has only talked to one of the plaintiffs. She claims that, by studying the plaintiff's medical histories. she has excluded other causes of these diseases but she is not a medical doctor and is not trained in differential diagnosis . . . also claims that she has "traced" the PCBs in the plaintiffs' bodies to the Paoli rail yard by examining them chemically. Because [she] is not a chemist I find this conclusion beyond the scope of her expertise.'*"
The District Court decision dismissing this case was, however, reversed by the Court of Appeals and remanded for further evidentiary proceeding^.'^^' The decision was reversed principally because the analysis rejecting the plaintiffs' causation evidence was not sufficiently specific. The Court of Appeals also found that
The court applied too stringent a standard to the qualification of experts under rule 702. . . .'2s. P
The Court of Appeals held that the qualification of an expert is not dependent on their formal academic degree but on the totality of their "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education." They held that there is no per se rule that nonphysicians are unqualified to testify about the medical condition of individuals exposed to chemical^."^^ P. 42) This appellate decision may restrict the power of a court to exercise control over expert testimony. It tends to reaffirm the principle that all decisions on factual matters are to be "left to the jury."
The Bendectin, Agent Orange, and PCB cases reflect attempts by judges to exercise control over the scientific evidence where there is a scientific consensus that the product has not been demonstrated to be a cause of disease.
Even more difficult are cases where the exposure is a statistical risk factor for the disease but where the disease also occurs in the absence of the exposure. This is where the distinction described by Judge Weinstein between "avoidance of risk through regulation" and "compensation for injury after the fact" is frequently obscured, One approach has been to shift the burden to the defendants to prove that the exposure did not cause the disease at issue, akin to the Summers v Tice'" approach. In a case involving downwind effects of nuclear testing, the judge shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that the diseases at issue were not caused by the exposure.
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Where a defendant who negligently creates a radiological hazard which puts an identifiable population group at an increased risk, and a member of that group develops a biological condition which is consistent with having been caused by the hazard to which he has been negligently subjected, such consistency having been demonstrated by substantial. appropriate, persuasive, and connecting factors, the fact finder may reasonably conclude that the hazard caused the condition absent persuasive proof to the contrary offered by the defendant.'26' This is an extreme example of a relaxation of the requirement that the plaintiff must demonstrate "causationin-fact ."
Where judges do not exercise control over the reliability of the scientific evidence there is an increased likelihood of verdicts based on a jury's belief that the defendant should be responsible rather than on a demonstration that the defendant is responsible. This situation was recently summarized:
But by and large plaintiffs are winning large verdicts in toxic tort cases not because it is easier to make the scientific showing which is theoretically required; instead, today's plaintiffs are winning toxic tort cases because juries are nullifying the former law and holding defendants liable even in the absence of persuasive proof of causation that meets the theoretical standards of tort law. '27' Some cases stretch the boundaries of knowledge even further than do claims of disease causation. Lawsuits have been brought in connection with environmental pollution where no illnesses occurred but where the plaintiffs claim to be suffering from emotional distress caused by a fear of developing cancer.(2x)
Under tort law, damages for emotional distress generally are permitted only when they accompany a physical injury. In Ayers, the court ruled that damages for "cancer phobia" could be considered if the plaintiffs could demonstrate that "the ingestion of the chemicals caused an alteration or change to their bodies." In such a case, an expert will be asked to testify regarding this "alteration or change."
The fact that science may not be able to give clear answers is further complicated when courts misunderstand the answers that are given.
A lawsuit was brought by a longshoreman who had been cleaning a spill of isobutylacrylate (IBA) in the hold of a ship. Within 5 weeks, he began experiencing skin problems and shortness of breath. He became permanently disabled and was diagnosed with diffuse pulmonary fibrosis and emphysema.'") A toxicologist testified for the plaintiff that the pulmonary fibrosis was caused by the exposure. He based this opinion on the chemical structure of IBA and the medical history. He acknowledged that there was no epidemiologic or toxicologic research reporting an association between IBA and pulmonary fibrosis.
The pharmacologist for the defense testified that there was a high incidence of pulmonary fibrosis in the region in which the plaintiff worked and that the plaintiff had been taking a drug associated with the development of pulmonary fibrosis.
In generally affirming the verdict for the plaintiff the Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence and pointed out 1. That the defense experts "could not point to a specific causative agent." 2. That a pulmonary physician who testified for the defense "admitted that the plaintiff's condition is idiopathic, that is, he cannot point to a specific causative agent."
These comments suggest a basic misunderstanding. First, they take the fact that the defense could not point to an alternative cause for the fibrosis as evidence that it was caused by IBA. Second, they interpret "idiopathic" to mean the inability to prove an external cause rather than simply referring to an internally generated process. Judges are not immune from the general view in our society that every disease has an identifiable "cause."
THE SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE QUESTION OF CAUSATION
Although claims of disease causation require a resolution of scientific issues, the legal system is not simply a scientific forum dressed up in strange clothes. The legal system must consider principles of social policy as well as scientific knowledge.
CHRONIC DISEASE LITIGATION
Scientific "truth" is only one aspect of this process.
Science seeks to find truth, making it possible to cure or prevent disease, develop new technologies, and make better predictions. Law seeks to find societal accommodation, making it possible for people to live together peacefully. Truth is a desideratum in legal process, not a sine qua non as in science. '30' Although science cannot provide the final answers in these cases, there are two principal "truths" that science can always bring to this process. The first is that there are no "truths," only hypotheses that have not been disproven, and the second is that empirical knowledge is only as good as the experiment or observation that produced it.
Karl Popper's analysis of scientific knowledge tells us that experimental results consistent with a theory can increase our subjective faith in the correctness of the theory, but they can never prove that the theory is true. Neither can they provide a basis for estimating the probability that the theory is true. The universe of evidence against which to compare the corroborative data is always unknown. This analysis applies to causal hypotheses in medicine as well as to quantum mechanics. One commentator summarized the problem as follows.
By claiming that a causal relation has been established, scientists have initiated an argument they cannot win.(3') Scientists, when in the role of policy makers may, of course, have to act on the best available knowledge. In doing so, however, their decisions, though based on a beliefin a causal relationship, are not demonstrably based on a proven causal relationship.
Causality currently lies at the very heart of epidemiology, yet it is vitally important to distinguish between a belief in causality and a scientific search for causality. . . . 13')
The skepticism of science extends to its own methodologies. The predictive value, for example, of short-term tests for carcinogenicity has been the subject of considerable debate. One analysis of short-term tests concluded that "carcinogens and noncarcinogens are about equally STT [short-term test]-po~itive,"'~~l They reported one study where 35% of substances classified as human carcinogens by IARC were negative in short-term tests and another study where 60% of chemicals that are noncarcinogenic in animal assays were positive in short-term tests.
A similar skepticism is applied to long-term bioassays. The species differences in toxic tolerance, metabolism, pharmacokinetics, site susceptibility, and so on limit the reliability of extrapolations from the results of animal experiments to humans. Substances can be carcinogenic in one animal species but not another. Aflatoxin, for example, is carcinogenic in the rat but is not carcinogenic in the C57B1 adult mouse.134) Results differ even between laboratories. One study of the production of lung adenomas in strain A mice found poor agreement between two laboratories. (35' Epidemiologists are similarly cautious about their data. In a recent study, researchers tested a hypothesis in a hospital population by two methods-a clinical trial and an observational study. In the observational study, they found an association between infant formula supplementation and reduced breastfeeding rates. In the clinical trial, there was no association. They attribute this difference, in part, to the element of self-selection in the observational Feinstein notes 56 different relationships in which the results of at least one epidemiologic study were contradicted by another.'37) He argues that causal relationships may be too readily accepted, citing the causal relationships that had been announced and then withdrawn between reserpine and breast cancer, coffee and pancreatic cancer, and alcohol and breast cancer.
The scientist's skepticism also extends to the significance given to the absence of data. Courts frequently place weight on their being more positive studies than negative ones. The lack of negative data, however, is frequently an artifact of the bias against publishing negative data. A survey of psychology publications reported, for example, that 82% of studies with positive outcomes submitted for publication were published against only 43% of studies with negative
